Sims v. Daker Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 39760 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
8-3-2012
Sims v. Daker Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39760
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Sims v. Daker Respondent's Brief Dckt. 39760" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3926.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3926
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JIMMY SIMS and SUSAN C. SIMS, 




EUGENE THOMAS DAKER and 
ELDA MAE DAKER, husband and 
















DOCKET NO. 39760 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appealed from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofIdaho 
in and for the County of Clearwater 
The Honorable Michael J. Griffin, District Judge Presiding 
Counsel for Appellants 
Mark S. Snyder 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 1346 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Counsel for Respondents 
Dale O. Cox 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 666 
Orofino, ID 83544 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JIMMY SIMS and SUSAN C. SIMS, 




EUGENE THOMAS DAKER and 
ELDA MAE DAKER, husband and 
















DOCKET NO. 39760 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appealed from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho 
in and for the County of Clearwater 
The Honorable Michael J. Griffin, District Judge Presiding 
Counsel for Appellants 
Mark S. Snyder 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 1346 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Counsel for Respondents 
Dale O. Cox 
Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 666 
Orofino, ID 83544 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page no. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................... . 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS.. ....... .... ...... ..... ... ... ...... ...... ... ......... .... 2 
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL....................... ... 4 
IV. ARGUMENTS.................................................................... .... 4 
V. ('ONCLUSION... ... ........... .............. .............. ...... ......... ... ... ..... 13 
-1-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Case Law: Page No. 
Lettunich v. Lettunich, III P.3d 110, 141 Idaho 425, (Idaho, 2005)...... ... ... ...... 4 
Luce v. lilvfarble, 127 P.3d 167, 142 Idaho 264 (2005)................................... 6 
Cameron v. Neal, 950 P.2d 1237, 130 Idaho 898 (Idaho 1997)........................ 6 
Flying Elk Investment, LLC v. Cornwall, 232 P.3d 330, 149 Idaho 9 (2010)......... 7 
Cecil v. Gagnebin, 202 P.3d 1, 146 Idaho 714 (2009).............. ..................... 8 
Teton Peaks Investment Co., LLC v Ohme, 195 P.3d 1207, 146 Idaho 394 (2008).. 8 
Dreher v. Powell, 819 P.2d 569,120 Idaho 715 (1991)... ...... ........................ 9 
Herrmann v Woodell, 693 P.2d 1118, 107 Idaho 916 (1985)........................... 9 
Wells v. Williamson, 794 P .2d 637, 118 Idaho 48 (1989)................................ 10 
Johnson v. Newport, 960 P.2d 742,131 Idaho 521 (1998).............................. 10 
Weitz v. Green, 230 P.3d 743, 148 Idaho 851 (Idaho, 2010)...... ...................... 11 
Downey v. Vavold, 166 P.3d 382, 144 Idaho 592 (Idaho, 2007)........................ 12 
Neider v. Shaw, 65 P.3d 525, 138 Idaho 503 (2003)...................................... 12 
Rules: 
Rule 54(e)(I), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure............. ................................ 4 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. . .. .. . . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. .. 4 
Statutes: 
Section 12-121, Idaho Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
-11-
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of a rural property line dispute. It was commenced by the Plaintiffs' 
Complaint filed on March 11, 2010, in District Court. The primary purpose of the initial 
complaint was to obtain the legal description of a long-time existing fence. Mr. and Mrs. Sims 
own the real property easterly of the fence line and Mr. and Mrs. Daker owned the real property 
adjacent thereto and westerly of the fence line. The complaint was filed followed by a Motion 
for Survey to determine the legal description of the long-existing fence. When the survey was 
completed and the legal description of the fence ascertained, Mr. and Mrs. Sims filed an 
Amended Complaint on November 2, 2010. In the amended complaint Mr. and Mrs. Sims 
claimed title to the real property described therein which is located easterly of the fence and 
identified the Dakers as the owners and Randy Hollibaugh as a lessee of the real property 
immediately westerly of their own real property. The entire purpose of this suit was to quiet title 
to the real property lying easterly of the long-existing fence in Mr. and Mrs. Sims. 
This case was tried in District Court without the intervention of a jury on January 17, 
2012. The District Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
Quieting Title in Mr. and Mrs. Sims westerly to the existing fence. 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Sims testified at the trial. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Daker was present at 
the trial. They did not testify by deposition, telephone, or Skype. 
Mr. and Mrs. Daker filed their Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2012. 
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II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the commencement of this case the Dakers and Simses were neighbors: Dakers to the 
west and Simses to the east. The Daker land was owned by Jim D. White prior to 1975 when he 
entered into an escrow contract to sell it to Tannahills. Following a mesne of transactions. 
Dakers obtained title from Craftwall in 1983. "Pl. Ex. 8." 
Alvin Smolinski. who owned a substantial amount of land on Greer Grade where the land 
in question is, leased the Daker land when it was owned by White, by the intervening owners, 
and by the Dakers. He rented from White for a few years "Tr. p.27. L. 1." After leasing it from 
White, he leased it from Tannahill, then Craftwall, and ultimately the Dakers until at least 2004 
"Tr. p.27, L. 20 to p.21, L. 6." Mr. Smolinski leased the Daker land for cattle. He took it upon 
himself to maintain the fence in question "Tr. p.30, L. 2." 
Mr. Smolinski considered the fence the boundary line between the Sims and Daker 
properties "Tr. p.30, L. 14, and p.35, L. 8 to 18," and testified that that was the custom in the 
area for fences ever since he could remember, probably 1967 "Tr. p.30, L. 20, to p.31, L. 7." 
Mr. Smolinski testified that he first started pasturing livestock on the property in the mid-
70's "Tr. p.36, L. 7," and that it appeared that it was an old fence at that time "Tr. p.36, L. 18." 
Therefore, the fence was in existence for over forty years. It never changed location. There was 
no evidence of a gate in it. 
Michael Kinzer who lives immediately above the Simses on Greer Grade testified that he 
purchased his property in 1975, that the fence was not new then but in good shape and well built 
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"Tr. p.SS, L. 7," and that critters and cattle were kept on both sides of the fence. There were two 
different logging operations on the Daker side to his knowledge and they did not cross the fence 
"Tr. p.SS, L. 21." 
Linda Beard whose parents sold the Sims land to them and now lives on Greer Grade 
testified that she was familiar with the Sims land and lived on it for about five and one-half years 
"Tr. p.8S, L. 11 to 21," and that her understanding was the boundary lines were the fence lines 
"Tr. p.8S, L. 22." The whole circumference of the property was fenced ·'Tr. p.86. L. 4:' They 
had animals and cut firewood. 
Mrs. Susan Sims testified that they moved into the residence on December 6, 1998. They 
purchased it from Mrs. Beard's parents, Elgin and Claudia Larson. When they looked at the 
property, Jimmy Sims walked the fence lines with Elgin while Claudia and Mrs. Sims talked on 
the deck. Claudia told Susan that the fence lines were the boundary lines "Tr. p.92, L. 23 to 
p.93, L. 14." She also testified that the parcel in dispute was essential to their privacy "Tr. p.97, 
L. 20," and they had trees that they were nurturing "Tr. p.98, L. 18." They would not have 
bought the property if the parcel in dispute was not included, "Tr. p.99, L. 13 to 19." 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Sims talked to Mrs. Daker by phone in December, 2009, and January, 
2010. Mrs. Sims talked; Mr. Sims listened on a second line. Mrs. Daker told them she and her 
husband bought the entire Daker place by fence line "Tr. p.73, L. 10 to 13, p.74, L.19, p.9S, L. 
13 to 19." 
There was no evidence of anyone, other than possibly the surveyor, relying on the legal 
descriptions in the deeds rather than the fence as the property boundary line. Even Randy 
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Hollibaugh, the Daker lessee, who hired the first survey, did not know the boundary line "Tr. 
p.49, L. 18, p.50, L. 19." 
During the pendency of this action in District Court, Mr. and Mrs. Daker sold all of their 
land except the parcel in question to Randy and Lauri Hollibaugh. The parcel in question was 
specifically excepted from that deed "Pl. Ex. 8." 
III. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
l. Are the District Court's findings of fact supported by substantial and competent. 
although conflicting evidence? 
2. Mr. and Mrs. Sims claim attorneys fees on appeal based upon Section 12-121, 
Idaho Code in conjunction with Rule 54( e)(1), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho 
Appellate Rule 41. 
IV. 
ARGUMENTS 
The standard of review of an appeal from District Court is well established in Idaho and 
set forth in Lettunich v. Lettunich, III P.3d 110. 141 Idaho 425, (Idaho, 2005). There our 
Supreme Court stated: 
When we consider an appeal from a district court sitting as the fact finder, we do 
so through our abuse-of-discretion lense (sic); that is. we examine whether the 
trial court (1) rightly perceived the issues as ones of discretion; (2) acted within 
the outer boundaries of that discretion and appropriately applied the legal 
principles to the facts found; and (3) reached its decision through an exercise of 
reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 
993, 1000 (1991). In conducting our review, we liberally construe the district 
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court's findings in favor of the judgment. Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 
Idaho 695, 699, 874 P.2d 506, 510 (1993). We will not disturb a district court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. A court's findings of fact are 
not clearly elToneous if they are supported by substantial and competent, though 
conflicting, evidence. Sun Valley Shamrock Resources. Inc. v. Travelers Leasing 
Corp, 118 Idaho 116, 794 P.2d 1389 (1990); Murgoitio v. Murgoitio, III Idaho 
573,576, 726 P.2d 685, 688 (1986); LR.C.P. 52(a). 
The basis of the Defendants' appeal is that the District Court did not have sufficient 
evidence to find that the long-existing fence in question constituted the boundary line. The 
Dakers are essentially seeking to retry the case itself to reach the opposite decision of the District 
Court. The District Court's findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent 
evidence. It is clear from the testimony at trial that all of the witnesses who testified concerning 
the boundary line and the fence relied upon the fence as the boundary line. There was no 
evidence whatsoever that any landowner at any time relied upon any survey as the boundary line. 
There was no evidence of reliance upon the legal descriptions. The evidence conclusively shows 
that the fence in question which stood for over forty years was treated and considered the 
boundary line between the two parcels of real property. There was no conflicting evidence 
whatsoever to the Court's findings that the fence was treated by all parties concerned as the 
boundary line between the Sims real property and the Daker property. Even without liberally 
construing the District Court's findings in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Sims, there was no evidence of 
any party or person not treating the fence in question as the boundary line. The survey line was 
not known on the ground until Mr. Hollibaugh obtained a survey in 2009. 
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The fence in question existed for more than fOliy or fifty years and was well maintained 
into 2003 when Alvin Smolinski was still pasturing cattle on the Daker property. Cattle were 
pastured on both sides of the fence up to the fence and predecessors in title logged both sides up 
to the fence. Mr. and Mrs. Sims rely upon boundary by agreement or boundary by acquiescence 
as they did in the District Court. The doctrine of boundary by agreement or acquiescence has 
long been established in Idaho's case law. Evidence of a long-established fence creates two 
presumptions: 
[W]hen a fence line has been erected, and then coterminous landowners have 
treated that fence line as fixing the boundary between their properties "for such a 
length of time that neither ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of its 
location" the law presumes an agreement fixing that fence line as the boundary. 
[Omitting citations.] 
Second, coupled with the long existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary, 
"the want of any evidence as to the manner or circumstances of its original 
location, the law presumes that it was originally located as a boundary by 
agreement because of uncertainty or dispute as to the true line." [Omitting 
citation.] 
Luce v. Marble. 127 P.3d 167, 142 Idaho 264 (2005). 
In Cameron v. Neal. 950 P.2d 1237, 130 Idaho 898 (Idaho 1997), the Court stated: 
The doctrine of boundary by agreement has long been established in Idaho's case 
law. To have a boundary by agreement, the location of the true boundary 
boundary line must be uncertain or disputed and there must be a subsequent 
agreement fixing the boundary. Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37, 41, 794 P.2d 
626, 630 (1990). The agreement need not be express, but may be implied by the 
surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties. Id. The existence of such 
an agreement between adjoining landowners may appear where their property 
rights have been defined by the erection of a fence, followed by treatment of the 
fence by the adjoining owners as the boundary. Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 
359,365,262 P.2d 1006, 1010 (1953). Further, the long existence and recognition 
of a fence as a boundary, in the absence of any evidence as to the manner or 
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circumstances of its original location, strongly suggests that the fence was located 
as a boundary by agreement. Beneficial Life Insurance Co. v. Wakamatsu. 75 
Idaho 232, 241, 270 P.2d 830, 835 (1954). Also, the payment of taxes on the 
property by the party asserting ownership of the disputed parcel is not required 
when determining a claim based on the doctrine of boundary by agreement. 
Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 633 P.2d 592 (1981). 
The court stated that the reasonable inference was that "the purpose of the fence was to serve as a 
boundary and was a barrier only incidentally, as with most fences." Although the Dakers discuss 
payment of taxes and adverse possession, that was not Simses theory of recovery or the District 
Curf s basis of judgment. 
See also Flying Elk Investment. LLC v. Cornwall. 232 P.3d 330, 149 Idaho 9 (2010), 
where the Court recognized the two presumptions and stated: 
This Court has repeatedly found a boundary by agreement where a fence is treated 
as the property line for a number of years, there is no information about why the 
fence was built, and no evidence to disprove that the fence was intended to be a 
boundary. 
The Dakers contend that the fence cannot be the boundary because it does not run parallel to the 
lines identified in the recorded deeds and because the fence does not constitute a straight line. In 
Flying Elk a crooked wire fence which divided the parcels ran roughly sixty feet south of 
Cornwall's described southern border and intruded into Flying Elk's property and then turned 
north and ran haphazardly into Flying Elk's northern boundary. The fence ran nearly three 
hundred feet into Flying Elk's legally described western edge. That left almost nineteen acres of 
Flying Elk's deeded legal description on Cornwall's side of the fence. The title to the disputed 
19 acres was quieted in Cornwall. 
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As the Dakers acknowledge in their Brie±: there is no information as to why the fence in 
question was built and there was no evidence whatsoever introduced to disprove that the fence in 
question was intended or considered the boundary between the two parties. This Court in Flying 
Elk stated that although "the fence encroached on Flying Elk's deeded property. it now marks the 
legal boundary between the parties." 
In Cecil v. Gagnebin. 202 P.3d 1, 146 Idaho 714 (2009), the Court stated that boundary 
by agreement from the location of a fence is "presumed from the long existence of the fence and 
the parties' treatment of it as the common boundary. Who built the fence, when it was built, and 
why it was built are unknown." The Court found that the fence constituted the boundary in that 
case and pointed out that the existence of the fence put the parties on constructive notice of it as 
the boundary line. Even though the fence in the instant case became in disrepair well after Mr. 
Smolinski ceased using the Daker land around 2004, he had maintained it well for years. Mrs. 
Daker acknowledged to Mr. and Mrs. Sims during telephone calls at least four times that the 
fences were the boundaries. They were obviously on notice when they purchased. 
The Dakers claim that the legal descriptions set forth in the deeds of the parties 
apparently require a reversal of the District Court's judgment in the instant case. In District 
Court they relied upon the legal descriptions and their survey, but that is not sufficient to reverse 
the District Court. In Teton Peaks Investment Co .. LLC v Ohme. 195 P.3d 1207. 146 Idaho 394 
(2008), the Court found that evidence that the fence had been erected and treated as the boundary 
for over sixty years gave rise to both presumptions set forth in Luce v. lviarble. supra p. 6, and 
found that because the parties relying on a survey offer no evidence other than the legal 
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descriptions set forth in the deeds, summary judgment was properly awarded in favor of the 
parties relying upon the fence. 
In Dreher v. Powell. 819 P.2d 569, 120 Idaho 715 (1991), the Court stated that a 
boundary by agreement is presumed to arise between neighbors and stated: 
[W]here such right has been definitely defined by erection of a fence ... followed 
by such adjoining landowners treating [the fence] as fixing the boundary for such 
length of time that neither ought to be allowed to deny the correctness of its 
location. [Citations omitted.] 
In the District Court, the Dakers claimed that the fence in question was a "drift" or 
"barrier" fence. No evidence was introduced to that effect. Naturally, a boundary fence would 
clearly be a barrier to keep cattle in or out. In a case very similar to the instant case, Herrmann v 
Woodell, 693 P.2d 1118, 107 Idaho 916 (1985), Herrmanns relied upon a fence which had been 
in existence for twenty-five years. The Woodells made no claims to the disputed property until a 
survey was completed and then they contended that the fence was constructed by their 
predecessors-in-interest as a barrier fence. The Woodells' predecessor in title testified that he 
considered the fence to be the boundary line. The Court held that the evidence supported a 
finding of acquiescence which established a presumption, unrefuted, that a boundary line 
agreement "must have taken place at some point in the past." There is no evidence in the instant 
case that the fence was constructed merely as a barrier. In fact, there was no evidence as to the 
purpose of the fence and; therefore, because of its long standing and existence, it constituted a 
boundary by agreement or acquiescence. 
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The Dakers also contend that due to the shape of the parcel in question, the fence cannot 
be a boundary line. They cite Luce v. l\1arble, supra. p. 6. In Luce there was no evidence of the 
parties on either side of the fences accepting them as the boundary. Furthermore, the .34 acre in 
dispute constituted a substantial portion of the 1.34 acres purchased by Marble. The parcel in 
dispute was bounded on the north, south and western borders by a fence and surrounded by the 
Marble property. The parcel in question constituted over 25 per cent of the real property 
purchased by Marble. The Supreme Court in Marble pointed out that the shape of the parcel in 
question was so irregular and encompasses "such a large portion of the Marble property, that an 
assumption of acquiescence would be unreasonable." In the instant case the parcel in dispute 
comprised about 3 acres while without it the Dakers had approximately 100 acres. Therefore, 
the parcel in dispute in the instant case is less than 2 or 3 per cent of the Daker property. The 
location of the fence in question cannot be considered unreasonable in view of the location 
depicted on the enlarged map "Df. Ex. B." 
In Wells v. Williamson, 794 P .2d 637, 118 Idaho 48 (1989), affirmed 794 P .2d 626, 118 
Idaho 37 (1990), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that it could find nothing in the Court of 
Appeals decisions nor the Idaho Supreme Court decisions "which suggest that application of this 
doctrine [boundary by agreement] should be arbitrarily limited to the particular size or 
configuration of the lot in question." 
See also Flying Elk Investment, LLC v. Cornwall, supra p. 7. 
In Johnson v. Newport, 960 P.2d 742,131 Idaho 521 (1998), the trial court found that the 
reason or circumstance for constructing the old fence of more than sixty years was not 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 10 
specifically known and that there was no evidence showing that the old fence was constructed 
merely for the convenience of previous landowners or expressly as an agreed boundary. The old 
fence followed the course of a creek rather than the line ultimately ascertained by a survey in 
1995. The trial court found that there was a boundary by implied agreement that followed the old 
fence. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that the shape of the parcel in dispute was 
irrelevant. The Court stated that "the law presumes boundary by agreement from the long 
existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary." The facts in Johnson v. Newport were 
extremely similar to ours. In affirming the trial court, our Supreme Court stated: 
There is also substantial and competent evidence to support the trial court's 
findings that (1) the parties and the predecessors each used the land on their 
respective sides of the old fence, (2) the parties and the predecessors treated the 
old fence as a boundary, and (3) the true boundary was uncertain until the 1995 
survey. 
The Dakers cite Weitz v. Green. 230 P.3d 743,148 Idaho 851 (Idaho, 2010), to the effect 
that a monument such as a fence must be observable sufficient to give notice of the boundary line 
agreement for a prospective purchaser. In Weitz v. Green the fence had become dilapidated over 
years and as such could not give sufficient notice to a prospective purchaser of the location of the 
fence or that the fence constituted a boundary line agreement. In the instant case however, the 
fence was well maintained until at least 2004 when Mr. Smolinski sold out and ceased renting the 
Daker land for cattle. "Tr. p.28, L. 7 to 14." The fence was obviously in good condition when the 
Dakers purchased their land in 1982 and Mrs. Daker acknowledged to Mr. and Mrs. Sims by 
telephone that she and her husband bought the entire Daker place by fence line. Mr. Smolinski 
first started pasturing cattle on the property in the mid-1970's and maintained the fences until 
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2004. Weitz v. Green does not support the Dakers in their appeal. The Dakers were not only on 
constructive notice of the fence line, but they knew and acknowledged the fence line as the 
boundary. 
The Defendants cite D01vney v. Vavold, 166 P.3d 382, 144 Idaho 592 (Idaho, 2007). One 
Ron Conner constructed a fence parallel to his property's western boundary, but approximately 
six to ten feet on his side of the boundary. There were survey pins that marked the true boundary 
line. The fence was inside those survey pins. There are other factors which also distinguished 
the Downey case from the instant case. The District Court found that an agreement establishing a 
boundary by the fence was not proven. The Supreme Court held that the District Court's 
conclusion was not clearly erroneous. The Court in Downey pointed out that the trial court's 
findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. In Lettunich v. Lettunich, 
supra p. 5, the Court stated: 
Again, our focus in reviewing the district court's order is not on whether we 
would have made the same decision, but rather on whether the court's ruling was 
based on substantial and competent evidence. 
The District Court in this case based its decision upon "substantial and competent evidence." 
The Dakers also cited Neider v. Shaw, 65 P.3d 525, 138 Idaho 503 (2003). That case 
involved a triangular piece of ground and the party opposing boundary by agreement claimed 
that the fence which had been built between 1935 and 1945 was a barrier to prevent cattle from 
roaming onto a railroad track. That party produced no evidence to support the theory and the 
Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's judgment quieting title pursuant to the existing 
fence. The facts of the Neider case are somewhat similar to those of the instant case. In Neider 
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no one knew who originally built the fence or why. The fence had been in existence for over 
fifty years and the parties claiming boundary by agreement considered the fence to be the 
western boundary of their property. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's findings of fact and decision can be reversed only if they are found to 
be clearly erroneous. The District Court's decision is well supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. The parties on both sides of the fence in question accepted it as the 
boundary line between the two parcels. The fence had been in existence in the mid-1970's and 
appeared to be an old fence at that time. It was well maintained by Mr. Alvin Smolinski and in 
good condition until 2004. Livestock were run on both sides of the fence and the land on both 
sides of the fence was logged as well. There was no evidence of any gate or anybody crossing 
the fence for any purpose. The District Court's decision that the fence constituted the boundary 
line is well supported by substantial and competent evidence. Except for a survey done in 2009, 
there was no evidence to the contrary. 
The Dakers even acknowledged and accepted the fences as the boundary lines when they 
purchased their land. They said that to Mr. and Mrs. Sims at least four times in telephone 
conferences. Moreover, when the Dakers sold their land to Mr. and Mrs. Hollibaugh, they 
specifically excluded the disputed parcel from the transaction. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed. 
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DATED this day 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of 2012, a full, true and correct copy 
of the foregoing instrument was served by mail, postage pre-paid, on the following: 
Mark S. Snyder 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 1346 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
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